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SYMPOSIUM ESSAY
RESTRAINTS BY REGIONAL AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS ON COMPETITION:
LESSONS FROM TRANSITION COUN-
TRIES
John Clark*
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) has, since 1992, engaged in an extensive pro-
gram of outreach to non-Member countries in several fields of
economic policy, including competition policy. Until the past
few years, the OECD's outreach was directed toward the tran-
sition countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central
Asia. Initially, much of the work involved assistance in draft-
ing laws and regulations effecting competition policy. Later the
focus changed to enforcement-to perfecting the techniques
employed in competition analysis.
The OECD settled on the "case study method" as an effec-
tive means of focusing on relevant issues in competition analy-
sis. Four or five seminars were, and still are, conducted annu-
ally in which cases from transition countries are discussed in
detail by participants from the OECD and transition countries.
The seminars provide useful insight into the types of cases
that are common in these countries, and the trends in the
cases over time. This Essay focuses on one type of
case-against bodies of regional and local governments for
anticompetitive acts-that has a somewhat unique character in
transition countries. There are lessons that one can draw from
these cases, however, that could prove useful to emerging mar-
ket economies in other parts of the world.
Transition countries-countries whose economies were
* Consultant, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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until the beginning of this decade centrally managed, with all
or most productive assets owned by the state,' have faced hero-
ic challenges in their efforts to develop market economies.
Within a few short years they had to accomplish the privatiza-
tion of huge amounts of state-owned assets, the creation of a
legal system that provided for rights of private property,
means of corporate governance and enforcement of contract
rights, and a system of regulation of the marketplace, consis-
tent with the promotion of competition wherever possible. Not
the least of these priorities was the enactment of a competition
law and the development of an effective competition policy.
Many transition countries moved quickly to write a compe-
tition law. Several such laws were in place by 1992. The laws
shared many common elements: prohibitions of abuse of a
dominant position and restrictive agreements that lessened
competition, and some form of merger control, though in the
merger area there was substantial variation among countries.
The enforcement body was usually in the form of a commis-
sion, either placed within one of the government ministries or,
less often, given nominal independence. The competition agen-
cy had adjudicative and enforcement powers, subject to appeal
to the courts. By 1995, some transition countries began to
write "second generation" competition laws. The new laws
often provided for a more comprehensive form of merger con-
trol and enhanced powers of information gathering and en-
forcement for the competition agency. Significantly, the new
laws in several Central European countries now approximate
the competition law of the European Union, as those countries
pursue membership in the European Union.
In at least one respect the competition laws of many tran-
sition countries were unique. They contained a fourth "sub-
stantive" violation in addition to abuse of dominance, restric-
tive agreements and merger control: anticompetitive acts by
bodies of government. To be sure, most competition laws apply
either explicitly or implicitly to entrepreneurial conduct by
government, but these provisions in transition country laws by
their terms applied to regulatory and governance functions as
well. It is not difficult to understand the historical basis for
1. This group includes, for purposes of this discussion, the fifteen former
Soviet republics, the four Visegrdd countries (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and
Slovak Republics) and Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia.
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such provisions. Bodies of government at all levels had been
the principal, if not the only, economic actors under central
planning. Old habits would die hard. It was considered neces-
sary to explicitly forbid interference by these bodies with the
new discipline of the marketplace.
I. THE LAWS
The competition law of the Russian Federation was emu-
lated in some respects by other former Soviet republics. Arti-
cles 7 and 8 of the Russian law applied to bodies of govern-
ment.2 Article 7, as it now exists in the current law, amended
in 1995, provides in part:
Federal organs of executive power, organs of executive power
of RF [Russian Federation] subjects, and organs of local self-
government shall be prohibited from issuing acts and/or per-
forming actions restricting the independence of business
persons and creating discriminatory or, conversely, favorable
conditions for the activity of individual business persons,
where such acts or actions have resulted or may result in
restraint of competition and/or infringement upon the inter-
ests of business persons or individuals . . .
Article 8 provides in part:
Agreements (concerted acts) by a federal organ of executive
power, organ of executive power of RF [Russian Federation]
subjects, and organ of local self-government with another
such organ or with a business person shall be prohibited and
shall, in the established manner, be held invalid, fully or in
part, whatever their form, where they have resulted or may
result in restraint of competition and/or in infringement upon
the interests of business persons or individuals ... 
Thus, Article 7 prohibits unilateral anticompetitive acts by a
2. Law on Competition and Limiting Monopolistic Activities on Commodity
Markets, Mar. 22, 1991, as amended May 25, 1995, arts. 7, 8 (Russ.), translated
in RUSSIA & THE REPUBLICS LEGAL MATERIALS 9 (John N. Hazard & Vratislav
Pechota eds., 1999). See generally Russell Pittman, Some Critical Provisions in the
Antimonopoly Laws of Central and Eastern Europe, 26 INTL LAW. 485 (1992).
3. Law on Competition and Limiting Monopolistic Activities on Commodity
Markets, supra note 2, art. 7.
4. Id. art. 8. See generally Russell Pittman, Competition Law in Central and
Eastern Europe: Five Years Later, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 179 (1998).
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governmental body and Article 8 prohibits anticompetitive
agreements involving a governmental body. These provisions
are equivalent to the prohibitions of abuse of dominance and
restrictive agreements by private enterprises.
Article 6 of the competition law of Ukraine forbids
"[d]iscrimination against business entities by government and
administrative organs."5 The article sets out specific acts of
discrimination that are prohibited, including prohibiting the
organization of new enterprises, forcing businesses to join
associations or to enter into specific contracts, interfering with
the marketing of goods across regions, and granting discrimi-
natory tax benefits. The article also prohibits agreements by
government bodies having the same effects.
Article 18 of the competition law of the Czech Republic
provides:
1. State and local administrative authorities may not re-
strict or eliminate economic competition by employing
their own provisions, apparent support or other methods.
2. Compliance with the obligations defined under para-
graph (1) shall be supervised by the [competition agen-
cy]. Based on evidence and analysis of results, the [com-
petition agency] may demand that authorities of state
and local administration rectify the faults.6
Other transition country laws that have, or until recently
had, similar provisions include Georgia,7 Hungary,8 Slovak
5. Law on Containing Monopolies and Preventing Unfair Competition in Busi-
ness Activities, Feb. 18, 1992, art. 6 (Ukr.), translated in RUSSIA & THE REPUB-
LICS LEGAL MATERIALs 5 (John N. Hazard & Vratislav Pechota eds., 1999).
6. Act on the Protection of Economic Competition, Jan. 30, 1991, as amended
Nov. 11, 1993, art. 18 (Czech Rep.), translated in JOHN FINGLETON ET AL., COMPE-
TITION PoLIcy AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 194 (1996).
7. On Monopoly Activity and Competition, June 25, 1996, ch. 5 arts. 16-26
(Geor.).
8. Act No. LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market
Practices, June 25, 1996, ch. 8 art. 63 (Hung.). The Hungarian law was amended
in 1997, however, and the new law does not contain such a provision.
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Republic,9  Bulgaria," Romania," Lithuania, 2  Latvia,"
and Estonia. 4
II. ENFORCEMENT
There has been no systematic study across countries of
enforcement of these articles applying to governmental bodies,
but anecdotal evidence indicates that those provisions were
heavily enforced in several countries in the early years after
enactment of the competition law. This resulted in a substan-
tial number of cases and enforcement actions. In recent years
the number of cases seems to have declined in some (but not
all) countries. The decline could be caused by any number of
factors, but two appear to be likely: first, in the transition
countries whose market economies are more mature, bodies of
local and regional government appear to have withdrawn pro-
gressively from their traditional roles as managers of the econ-
omy. Second, of those violations that do occur, more are being
resolved informally by the competition agency and the offend-
ing body, resulting in fewer formal cases.
In the early years of these laws, many of the cases against
government bodies involved regulatory discrimination in situa-
tions in which the local authority was both operator of some or
all of the assets in the relevant market and regulator of that
market. Cases in transportation, energy, and telecommunica-
tions markets were common. The local authority as regulator
would discriminate in favor of itself or its affiliate as operator.
These cases have declined in number in countries where pri-
vatization is complete and national regulatory schemes have
been established, but in others this type of case is still fre-
9. Law on the Protection of Economic Competition, July 8, 1994, art. 18
(Slovk.), translated in CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL MATERIALS (Vratislav
Pechota ed., 1998).
10. Protection of Competition Act, May 2, 1991, art. 2 (Bulg.), translated in
CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL MATERIALS (Vratislav Pechota ed., 1999).
11. On the Protection of Competition, June 24, 1994, arts. 17-28 (Rom.).
12. Law on Competition, Sept. 15, 1992, art. 6 (Lith.), translated in CENTRAL
& EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL MATERIALS (Vratislav Pechota ed., 1998).
13. Law on Competition, June 18, 1997, arts. 5-14 (Lat.). Latvia amended its
law to take effect on January 1, 1998, and the new law explicitly applies to state
and local governments and government institutions "only insofar as they act as
market participants in private law relationships." Id. art. 4, para. 1.
14. Law on Competition, July 7, 1993, art. 2 (Est.), translated in CENTRAL &
EASTERN EUROPEAN LEGAL MATERIALS (Vratislav Pechota ed., 1998).
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quent. In many countries, including non-transition countries,
local and regional authorities continue to provide some services
and to act in some capacity as regulator. Local transportation
(taxi, bus, passenger rail), energy, and waste removal and
disposal are such markets.
In 1997, the OECD conducted a comprehensive analysis of
125 cases decided by the Russian Antimonopoly Committee
between 1994 and 1996." Of these 43, or 34%, involved in-
fractions of Articles 7 and 8.16 The conduct was further classi-
fied as follows: 25%, inappropriate licensing or issuing of per-
mits, or refusals to do so; 16%, discrimination in favor of or
against particular entities (with respect to fees, contracting,
etc.); 16%, interference in business activity (price setting or
establishing priority of supply); 14%, restriction of movement
of goods between areas; 12%, improper orders for transfer of
property; 7%, improper granting of administrative authority to
an economic subject; and 7%, imposition of fees on trade. 7 Of
the 43 cases, 37% concerned actions by regional executive bod-
ies and the remainder involved local executive bodies. 8 There
were no cases involving federal bodies in the group.
A few typical cases involving restraints by local and re-
gional governments in transition countries are as follows. 9
A. Lithuania-Bus Transportation
The Municipality of KIaipeda granted concessions to forty-
eight private bus operators to provide passenger bus service in
the town. It also introduced a tax on these operators for the
privilege of operating in the center of town. The Municipality
was also the founder of one of the private bus operators, and
for this operator the Municipality provided a subsidy for carry-
ing certain passengers and exempted the operator from paying
the tax. The Competition Council determined that this conduct
15. COMPETITION AND CONSUMER POLICY DIVISION OF THE ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMlIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REVIEW OF THE CASE PRACTICES OF
THE STATE ANTIoNoPoLY CoMmIEE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE BASIS
OF THE CASE RECORDS OF THE OECD COMPETITION AND CONSUMER POLICY DIVI-
SION (1998) (on file with author).
16. See id. at 56.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. These cases were presented at various OECD case study seminars held for
competition enforcement personnel from transition countries (on file with author).
368 [Vol. XXV:2
RESTRAINTS ON COMPETITION
violated Article 6 of the competition law, and requested that
the Municipality cancel the discriminatory subsidy and tax
exemption.
B. Russian Federation-Shipment of Scrap Metal
The Head of Administration of the Tula region imposed
restrictions on the ability of generators of metal scrap to sell
and ship their scrap to entities located outside the region. In
particular, entities situated within Tula could not ship their
scrap to outside purchasers without the consent of two local
scrap recyclers, and the Tula branch of the railroad could not
allocate freight cars for such shipments without the consent of
these two enterprises. The Tula Territorial Office of the Rus-
sian Antimonopoly Committee determined that these actions
by the Regional Administration violated Articles 7 and 8 of the
Russian antimonopoly law and ordered the Administration to
cease the conduct.
C. Latvia-Trading of Privatization Certificates
As part of its program of privatization, the Latvian govern-
ment issued privatization certificates (PCs), which could be
used to purchase property to be privatized and which could be
traded on the open market. The law permitted any enterprise
to obtain a license to trade in PCs, and more than 100 firms
obtained such licenses. Another law, however, limited the num-
ber of banks that could maintain PC accounts to three specific
banks, and as the result of other circumstances, one of the
three banks effectively enjoyed a monopoly in the maintenance
of PC accounts. This monopoly, in turn, conferred an over-
whelming advantage to the bank in the market for trading
PCs. The Latvian competition agency entered into negotiations
with the Ministry of Finance for revisions of the regulations
governing the trading of PCs.
D. Slovak Republic-Solid Waste Removal and Disposal
An association of fourteen municipalities and seven private
enterprises was formed to build and operate a solid waste
landfill, which because of the scarcity of other sites and avail-
able capital was the only operating landfill in the area. The
association also agreed, however, that all collection and trans-
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portation of solid waste within the member municipalities
would be conducted by one firm. The Slovakian Competition
Authority correctly concluded that two separate markets were
involved-collection/transportation and disposal of solid
waste-and that competition could exist in the former. It or-
dered that the association eliminate the restriction to a single
enterprise for collection/transportation.
III. ANALYSIS AND EXTRAPOLATION TO NON-TRANSITION
COUNTRIES
The transition country competition laws specifically apply-
ing to governmental bodies are broad in scope and design, but
there are practical and political limits to enforcing them. Very
few of the cases that the OECD has observed have involved
national agencies or regulators. As noted above, of 125 such
cases in Russia, none involved national bodies. There are at
least two reasons for this. First, in virtually all countries, in-
cluding non-transition countries, there is an express or implied
exemption from the competition law for conduct that is explic-
itly authorized or required by national statute. Second, and at
least as important, in transition countries and in many others
as well, the competition agency is not politically strong enough
to confront another agency of the national government. The
transportation, communication or energy ministry, for exam-
ple, usually has vastly more power and influence than the
competition agency at the national level in transition coun-
tries.
In many countries the competition agency faces political
realities at the regional and local level as well. The balance of
power may still not be in the competition agency's favor."0 In
any case, the competition agency does not have at its disposal
the full range of investigation and enforcement powers that it
can apply to private enterprises. It is difficult to demand the
production of information from another government agency,
and to impose and enforce binding prescriptions on such a
20. An extreme example is Russia. Because of its huge size (there are 11 time
zones in Russia) there are dozens of regional offices of the Russian Antimonopoly
Committee (recently reconstituted as a ministry). Because of their distance from
Moscow, the regional offices are almost autonomous, though it is not a situation
that they prefer. They are an arm of the national government, but they may not
be as politically strong as the regional governments that they may have to control.
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body. The laws of some transition countries, in fact, permit the
competition agency only to petition the offending governmental
body for relief.2 In any event, binding orders or, in the ex-
treme, fines, are often not politically feasible."
The agency, then, is left to attempt a favorable resolution
through negotiation and voluntary agreement. Yet in this situ-
ation-where the competition agency is relatively weak com-
pared to its government adversary-the laws explicitly forbid-
ding anticompetitive conduct by government bodies are never-
theless most useful. The fact that the competition agency has
determined that the local body has violated national law and
has said so publicly in a decision (or can do so, if it hasn't yet),
strengthens the agency's hand significantly in negotiations.
That these laws exist, even if they are not fully enforceable,
has had a salutary effect in transition countries in their efforts
to eliminate competitive restraints by local and regional gov-
ernments.
What are the implications of the transition country experi-
ence for emerging market economies in other parts of the
world, where similar laws explicitly banning anticompetitive
conduct by governments do not exist? The situation in transi-
tion countries is unique in some respects. The tendency toward
anticompetitive restraints by governments is probably stron-
gest in the transition context, but such restraints exist in every
country, and they are likely to be common in all emerging
market economies. The explicit prohibitions of anticompetitive
governmental conduct in transition country laws are not likely
to be found in, or added to, existing competition laws else-
where, however. Indeed, they are gradually being eliminated
from second generation transition country laws.2 As noted
above, however, the principal benefit of such laws for competi-
tion agencies in transition countries has been to strengthen the
moral authority of the competition agency in its attempts to
eliminate such restraints. Competition agencies in other coun-
tries enjoy a similar, if more diffuse power, especially in their
dealings with local and regional governments.
21. See supra text accompanying note 6.
22. Interestingly, in a few cases the Russian Antimonopoly Committee imposed
a fine on another government body.
23. As noted above, second generation laws in Hungary and Latvia have omit-
ted such provisions. See supra notes 8, 13.
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The transition country experience with restraints by gov-
ernments on competition highlights two conditions that are
generally applicable. First, such restraints exist everywhere,
especially in transition and emerging market economies, and
eliminating them should be a priority of competition agencies
in these countries. Second, while competition agencies usually
do not have sufficient authority to prosecute such conduct in
the same way that they can prosecute private restraints, they
have considerable authority as public advocates for competi-
tion, and by using it aggressively and skillfully can achieve
much to eliminate restraints on competition by other govern-
ment bodies.
